DePaul Business and Commercial
Law Journal
Volume 5
Issue 4 Summer 2007: Symposium - Corporate
Governance: The Ins and Outs for Ds and Os

Article 5

Here and Now: Trends in the D&O World
Frederick Reed
Lee McCorkle
William Schorling

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj

Recommended Citation
Frederick Reed, Lee McCorkle & William Schorling, Here and Now: Trends in the D&O World, 5 DePaul Bus.
& Com. L.J. 705 (2007)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj/vol5/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae.
For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

Here and Now: Trends in the D&O World*
Frederick (Fritz) Reed, Lee McCorkle, and Bill Schorling

MR. REED: Thank you. We are, in fact, going in the opposite order
of our introductions. And so, Bill, do you want to be our moderator?
MR. SCHORLING: Thank you, Fritz. Yes, it's our fault for not telling anybody else.
I'm going to use some terms and some of them you have heard already, but I thought I would explain them before we get into the discussion so rather than having jargon, it may be jargon you understand.
We'll talk about ISS. 1 ISS is a firm that advises people on how to
vote on officers and directors in publicly traded corporations and on
issues that appear in the proxy statements. It arose out of the obligation placed on pension advisors under ERISA 2 to make informed decisions on issues that they're to asked to vote on as shareholders.
Leo Strine, Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Chancery
Court-you've already heard a lot of discussion about Vice Chancellor Strine. I'll give you some additional background. Vice Chancellor
Strine teaches a course at the University of Pennsylvania Law School
on director and officer obligations. He's one of the foremost thinkers
about to whom those obligations are owed. He also participates in the
Institute for Law and Economics at the Wharton School and the University of Pennsylvania Law School. I participate in that, as well as
does Judge Ambro.
Now you didn't hear Judge Ambro's name used much, but Judge
Ambro wrote CitX,3 and he's written a number of other important
opinions in the area. Judge Ambro sits on the Third Circuit. Judge
Ambro was a practitioner in Delaware prior to joining the Third
Circuit.
I am going to talk about Lynn LoPucki. Lynn LoPucki is a professor
at the University of California at Los Angeles Law School. He has
written extensively. He's probably the-or probably most notable for
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the third panel at the
AND COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM,

DEPAUL BUSINESS

Corporate Governance: The Ins and Outs for Ds

and Os, held on April 19, 2007.
1. The full name of the firm is Institutional Shareholders Services.
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2007).
3. In re CitX Corp., 448 F.3d 672 (3d Cir. 2006).
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his empirical work in bankruptcy. Most bankruptcy scholars owe a
great deal to Professor LoPucki for his empirical work.
I don't agree with Professor LoPucki on everything he writes. I participated in panels with Professor LoPucki where I took the opposite
view. But Professor LoPucki has, along with several other professors
at UCLA, propounded a theory of corporate governance called the
4
team production theory.
I'm going to rely on that quite a bit. There's an unpublished manuscript in the materials that Professor LoPucki gave us permission to
reproduce that talks about the team production theory.5 So that's
Lynn LoPucki.
Judge Posner. Judge Posner is on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. He is well-known for law and economics. Judge Posner also participates in the Institute for Law and Economics and has made some
interesting comments on corporate governance.
So those are some of the shorthand-some background to some
people I'm going to talk about in shorthand.
My own background, I'm a bankruptcy lawyer. I also represent directors and officers primarily in causes of action arising out of alleged
breaches of fiduciary obligations in insolvent companies. I am admitted in Delaware. I practice in Delaware. I'm also admitted in Pennsylvania and practice there as well.
But I am-and I'll reveal my bias-I'm a proud Delaware lawyer. I
believe that the Delaware Chancery Court is the foremost authority
on obligations of directors and officers.
As my introduction noted, I did teach at Temple. I should warn you:
I stopped when I decided I wasn't doing a very good job. So what I'm
going to talk about is an overview of the trends that I think are emerging in the duties of directors and officers. It's not what the law is. It's
what the law-where the law is going.
Of the students here, how many of you have had a corporations
course? Business organizations course? Okay. For you, you're probably safe because you aren't going to be asked on a test what the obligations are of officers and directors. For those of you who may be
taking the course in the future, don't cite me or talk about the principles I'm going to espouse. They're not the law yet. Okay. You can do
it after you have set forth the law, but they're not the law yet.
4. Lynn LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization (Nov. 6, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=397801.
5. Id.
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Vice Chancellor Strine and Judge Ambro and Judge Posner have
said a number of things. And gossip is always interesting, especially
lawyers, otherwise the American Lawyer wouldn't exist. But, in addition, they have written a lot. I'm really going to try to limit my comments to their writings.
The one violation of that rule is I'm going to talk about Judge Posner. Many people think that boards of directors, especially those in
publicly traded companies, are broken. It's pretty clear they're broken
in a number of areas, but those that have received the most attention
are executive compensation. And Judge Posner, in a lecture at the
University of Pennsylvania, espoused the position that the market no
longer works in the area of executive compensation, that the boards of
directors are not exercising appropriate oversight, and that we probably need regulation. Coming from Judge Posner, that is an astounding
statement. He is a free-market proponent.
Shareholder votes. Vice Chancellor Strine in a speech at the University of Iowa took the position that shareholder voting really wasn't
working anymore, that it wasn't serving the corporate interest. He's
skeptical of whether actions taken by short-term holders of securities,
of stock, benefit the corporation in the longer term. I think it's re6
flected in some of his opinions. I'm going to talk about both Trenwick
7
and Production Resources somewhat.
He thinks there are problems with ISS and similar providers. I think
as you will hear, the panel has problems with ISS as well. But he expresses grave concerns about whether or not corporate governance is
addressing the long-term interest of corporations.
Finally, there's been a lot of talk including from Lynn LoPucki on
both the failure of Chapter Elevens 8 to reorganize because of the significant number of Chapter Twenty-Twos 9 that are occurring, for instance, the USAir Chapter Eleven. For those of you who are not
bankruptcy lawyers, Chapter Twenty-Twos are repeat bankruptcies.
Professor LoPucki is of the view that that evinces a failure of the first
bankruptcy case. 10 He ascribes that failure to the courts and the failure of the courts.1 1 I think it's better described as a failure of the
6. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), affd sub
nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2007 WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
7. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (2006).
9. Chapter Twenty-Two is an unofficial term for a company that has filed for Chapter Eleven
twice.
10. LYNN LoPuCKI, COURTINO FAILURE (University of Michigan Press 2005).
11. Id.
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boards of directors to properly address the duties and the constituencies to whom they owe those duties.
So we've got the three duties of directors and officers: duty of care,
and that's the business judgment rule; duty of good faith; and the duty
of loyalty. And many people conflate the duty of good faith and the
duty of loyalty. We're going to be talking-I'm going to be talking
about the duty of care. If the duty of good faith or the duty of loyalty
is breached, that's a cause of action. And the boards are going to be
liable for that; and that's primarily self-dealing.
So I'm going to be talking really in the area of the duty of care. It's
process oriented. It looks to whether or not the board properly went
through the process. It's a matter of public policy and encourages directors to serve on boards because their decisions aren't going to be
second guessed if they exercised and went through the proper steps in
reaching their decision.
The Disney decision1 2 in Delaware arguably broadened the scope of
the duty of care. In Disney, the Delaware Supreme Court said that
where the allegation of the complaint was that the directors acted to14
tally uninformed, 13 that was a breach in the duty of care.
I think prior to Disney,' 5 the courts hadn't gone that far. I'm not
going to talk about this because I don't find that that interesting. I am
going to talk about to whom the duty is owed and the implications of
that on the permissible bounds of decision-making by directors and
officers.
There are competing views. The primary view, and the long-held
view, is that in a solvent corporation, the duties of officers and directors are owed to shareholders-that is, that they have to take the interest of the shareholders into account in reaching their decisions. The
shareholders elect the board, and the board is answerable to the
shareholders.
Some scholars have concluded that the election function doesn't
work in the modern corporation, and I have a cite in my outline which
is in your materials. 16 The contrary view is the team production view.
That's the one that Lynn LoPucki has espoused, Blair and Stout as
well, primarily out of the University of California in Los Angeles. 17 It
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85

VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).

17. Id.
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is based on director primacy.1 8 It creates a super group of directors
whose interest it is to look out for all of the constituencies of the
corporation.1 9
In the constituent groups, the team are those who have entered into
a bargain with the corporation, and they don't look solely to contracts,
but to all of the constituencies. It would include suppliers. It would
include employees. It could include the community if the community
has invested in infrastructure. But there's an implicit, if not explicit,
quid pro quo that they will receive the benefits that the corporation
has received. They'll receive their share of those benefits.
It's based on a lack of trust of the other team members because you
could empower the other team members to make that decision, but no
one entrusts someone who may seek to increase his or her stake in the
benefits or the profits of the corporation at the expense of others, so
that they entrust the decision to the board.
It is both a positive and a normative theory in that it is testable in
the empirical data, and normative because you can predict or espouse
an appropriate behavior.
20
The developments in the zone of insolvency in Chapter Eleven
corporations have supported this view. I'm going to look to
Trenwick2 and Production Resources22 in particular because they
start out on the issue in front of Vice Chancellor Strine as to who is
the person on whose behalf the fiduciary obligations of directors and
officers should be exercised. And he talks about creditors and he talks
about shareholders.
But he begins in Production Resources,23 actually to go all the way
back to Credit Lyonnais24 and Chancellor Allen, to find support where
the classes of persons whose interests may be considered in exercising
the directors duties have begun to expand. At least when they talk
about to whom the duty is owed, they begin to expand beyond the
constituencies of shareholders and creditors.
In Credit Lyonnais, the court said the board has an obligation to the
community of interests that sustain the corporation to exercise judgment in an informed, good faith effort to maximize the corporation's
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (2006).
21. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), affd
sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2007 WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
22. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 772.
23. Id.
24. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
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long-term wealth-creating capacity. 25 That goes significantly beyond
shareholders.
Vice Chancellor Strine in Production Resources talks about, as the
prior panel did, the fact that Credit Lyonnais26 has been seized upon
by courts as an affirmative weapon against the board, as opposed to a
defensive weapon. 27 That is the position that Credit Lyonnais heldthat the board did not owe a duty solely to shareholders.28
In ProductionResources, Vice Chancellor Strine speaks of maximizing corporation value to best satisfy the legitimate claims of all of its
constituents. 29 He goes on to say in Trenwick that some scholars are
critical of a jurisprudence that expresses the view that directors owe
fiduciary duties to the corporation itself rather than a particular constituency of the corporation. 30 The Delaware Chancery Court does
31
not share this concern.
In Trenwick, Vice Chancellor Strine says that even in an insolvent
corporation, directors are not prevented from making judgments
about how generous or stingy to be to other corporate constituencies
in areas where there is no concise legal obligation to those constituencies. 32 So, again, the court is speaking of taking into account interests
well beyond those of shareholders and creditors.
The problem with this view comes as to how you circumscribe the
permissible exercise and the discretion if the board can take into account the interest of many other constituencies. Vice Chancellor
Strine in Trenwick, while he talks about taking into account the other
interests, says that the directors may do so if they believe that will
improve the firm's value and return to its creditors. 33 So that, here,
Vice Chancellor Strine is back to looking to the value of the firm in
general.
In bankruptcy, the traditional views of corporate governance don't
fit. In the traditional view of corporate governance, the board is
elected by shareholders. In Chapter Eleven, 34 the board was initially,
pre-petition, elected by the shareholders. Typically, there's no annual
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
863 A.2d at 772.
1991 WL 277613.
863 A.2d at 772.
906 A.2d at 168.
Id.
Id.
Id.
11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (2006).

2007]

TRENDS IN THE

D&O

WORLD

meeting held. The board continues in perpetuity. It looks an awful lot
like the team production theory.
Others in the area of bankruptcy have said that the interest of
noneconomic constituents, noncontractual constituents should be
taken into account. Professor Warren has taken that position. 35 Professor, now President, Gross has taken that position in terms sup36
ported by the legislative history.
There is opposing that view, a contractarian view, which is that corporations are just made up of a bunch of contracts. If you don't have a
contract through the corporation, your interests don't deserve to be
protected. That view, however, has started to fail; and that's a view
38
that Professor Jackson 37 has espoused along with Professor Mooney
at Penn.
But then you get to the debtor-in-possession. That just doesn't fit a
contractarian theory because the board of directors is exercising decision-making power on behalf of the debtor-in-possession, but the
board is not appointed by the creditors. It is elected by the pre-petition shareholders and, as I said, begins to look like a permanent institution. He's not re-elected. They don't hold elections every year.
Indeed, when shareholders have tried to change the board, the
courts have not-have enjoined that exercise where they believed that
it would interfere with the reorganization. It goes back to a case like
Lifeguard Industries,3 9 which was decided by a court in Ohio; Fritz
represented the bank and I represented the creditors' committee.
So the issue becomes, if we agree that we can take into account
other interests, how do we circumscribe that discretion? Professor
LoPucki says, in bankruptcy, we circumscribe it by the difference between the liquidation value and the going concern value; that difference can be allocated among various constituencies. 40 Query: How do
you do it outside of bankruptcy? Also, query: Whether or not there
should be a difference in how corporations are governed in and out of
bankruptcy?
In summary, I think that the Delaware Chancery Court has indicated that it is heading this way. I think we can anticipate more deci35. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336
(1993).
36. KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS (Yale University Press 1997).
37. Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989).
38. Charles W. Mooney, A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (is) Civil
Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2004).

39. In re Lifeguard Industries, Inc., 37 B.R. 3 (Bankr. D. Ohio 1983).
40. LoPucki, supra note 4, at 34.
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sions. Hopefully the Trenwick supreme court decision 4 t will shed
further light on it,42 but the team production theory does appear to be
one answer as to how directors should exercise their discretion in the
years ahead.
MR. REED: It is an interesting theory. We've heard a lot of discussion and certainly-for example, at noon today, we heard an impassioned plea that we should take a broader view than the statutory
scheme.
Earlier today, somebody was making analogies, or being reminded
of movies, and then it was Monty Python.43 This theory reminds me of
the Piratesof the Caribbean44 where they said, you have to adhere to
the code, and in this case, maybe the bankruptcy code, but a little
later, we heard but the code really is just more guidelines.
That isn't what the code is. In a bankruptcy context, at least, it is a
theory propounded by people who can't get the statute passed by
Congress. The idea that you can-that you can ignore the statutory
scheme set out specifically and say, well, it is found in the legislative
history, admittedly, not in the statute, but in the legislative history;
and then give it a different result or a different-a different, in the
case of all the arguments, priority than the statute allows is not something that I think is going to get traction in the bankruptcy court.
I don't think it ought to outside either, but the policing of it is much
more difficult in a solvent corporation where there the penalty for
directors ignoring the more traditional definitions of to whom the
duty is owed is a function of shareholder vote.
MR. SCHORLING: I don't think you can get away with it as easily
just to say it's the code and you have to follow the code because the
code doesn't give all the answers. The board has to propose a plan of
reorganization which has to take into account myriad interests.
MR. REED: Absolutely.
MR. SCHORLING: One. Number two, you have got Sections
111345 and 1114,46 and you heard about it at lunch. There is no stan41. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), affd
sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2007 WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
42. After the Symposium, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed both the holding and reasoning of the Court of Chancery in Trenwick. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, No. 495, 2007
WL 2317768 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007).
43. MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Michael White Productions 1975).

44. PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN:
2003).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2006).
46. Id. § 1114.

THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL

(Walt Disney Pictures
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dard in Sections 111347 and 111448 other than equitable. And so I've
got some hypotheticals that are attached to my materials that raise
issues as to how you would advise the board. While they are couched
as hypotheticals, they actually come from real cases.
MR. McCORKLE: Don't you, in bankruptcy context, always have
the fallback of the decisions of the bankruptcy judge, who often starts
with, this is a court of equity, not of law. And so there's a fair amount
of security in looking for a novel approach that I wonder-I wonder if
that security exists in playing with a solvent corporation?
MR. SCHORLING: Well, what happens if I just go back to Vice
Chancellor Strine's statement in Trenwick that you can take these
other interests into account so long as it's consistent with the long49
term economic benefit of the corporation?
MR. McCORKLE: Well, let's leave the long-term, short-term for a
minute because I'm going to get into that. At least I think ft's worth
talking about. But I think that the citation that says you can take the
other interests into account still flies in the face of a good deal of
history saying that the duty of the directors is to the shareholders.
There are some statutory exceptions to that, I know.
MR. SCHORLING: But isn't the question: what's in the interest of
the shareholders? Is it long-term interest? Is it short-term interest?
MR. McCORKLE: Well, that's one question. I think the other question as you raised it, and that is, to what extent are the directors permitted to consider the interest of other stakeholders, business
partners, employees, those who support the activities of the
enterprise?
You are smiling at me as if you have won your case.
MR. SCHORLING: No, I am not. I don't have an answer.
MR. McCORKLE: I don't think there is an answer. But one of the
concerns we run obviously is trying to provide some predictability in
an uncertain world. And the mistakes that we make today are what
this seminar will be talking about five years from now in the courts'
written opinions about it.
MR. SCHORLING: I guess where I come out of it is that you can't
explain it all with the contractarian theory. You just can't. And given
that there are too many-there are exceptions to the contractarian
theory, is there a better theory? And does a team production theory
better reflect reality?
47. Id. § 1113.
48. Id. § 1114.
49. 906 A.2d 168.
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MR. McCORKLE: And if it did, the implementation would be legislative, presumably.
MR. SCHORLING: Vice Chancellor Strine doesn't seem to think
that it needs to be legislative. In his opinions, he's indicated that he
thinks we can take those into account.
MR. REED: Most of the rhetoric, though, around additional interests are not defined, or are often not defined in terms of what's best
for the corporation, but what is best for the constituency that somebody is putting forward. And to the extent that it is that, that's where I
get cross-wise with it.
In a solvent corporation where the board of directors is sitting there
trying to decide how the accommodation of additional constituencies,
besides shareholders, creditors, and-or traditional shareholders and
creditors to include employees, the city, if you want, because they invested in the streets system or gave them a tax break or whatever, all
of those things to the extent that it is in the context of trying to decide
what the long-term value increase is in the company I think is fine.
To the extent that it is a pretext for simply advancing the cause of a
specific group, then you lose it; and that's-and the idea that it is put
in the context of a team theory when that isn't the purpose isMR. McCORKLE: Even if whatever the concession is enhances the
value to the corporation provided by that group?
MR. REED: No. I think if it enhances the value of the corporation,
because you have done that, you have met the test. The fact that you
say that's what you're doing when you're doing something else is
where I have the problem.
MR. McCORKLE: Of course.
MR. SCHORLING: Fritz, do you want to50
MR. REED: We're going to bore you with Disney.
MR. McCORKLE: Disney51 has no interest to Bill, which I won't
talk about a great deal, but I do have a framed copy of it over my bed;
and I'm happy to cite it for the proposition that directors can do just
about anything as long as they follow the right process.
MR. SCHORLING: We're going to have to consider the six-month
trial.
MR. McCORKLE: Sure. And that, I want to say, is probably the
law. It says, as we provide-try to provide-some measure of predictability in what is an unsettled and an uncertain world, at least from my
view point; and that may make it worth saying two things.
50. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
51. Id.
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If you listened to my biography, I am a general counsel of a publicly
traded company. 52 So you will at least understand, if not forgive, my
paranoia.
Second, I hope that none of you, should you ever meet my mother,
would let her know that you saw me sitting between two insolvency
lawyers.
Let me do a little contrast here. I just want to read some materials.
The great strength of Delaware's corporation law, including the business judgment rule, is that corporate fiduciaries, even though subject
to high standards in fulfilling their stewardship over the assets of
others, have wide latitude in their efforts to maximize shareholder investments, so long as they act faithfully and honestly on behalf of
those whose interests they represent. That is a generalized statement
and one in which I take a great deal of comfort.
This morning, we talked about Sarbanes-Oxley.5 3 Consider the difference in approach. Whatever the Sarbanes-Oxley objectives are, it
has resulted in what can be described easily as a feeding-frenzy of
checklists. Its approach is detailed regulations; minutia required; specific, detailed requirements; and an intent-actually a disregard of intent in some instances, maybe even criminalized activity without
scienter. It has resulted in, I think, and will continue to result in, a
homogenization of generally accepted accounting principles, both out
of fear by the remaining four major firms, and also because of the
government's intrusion over the accounting-standards people by virtue of the public accounting board.
It has generated tons of SEC writings, almost all staff; and all of that
is directed to specific activity without reference to the rush to
judgment.
Now if you look at-if you look at the Disney case, 5 4 which I think
is worth reading even if I'm interested in only a couple of points or
perspectives. A board cares about enhancing shareholder value and
can, almost certainly in today's law, consider other values or other
interests as well. But it cares practically for the integrity of its actions;
that is, that its actions will stick.
A CEO is interested in as much freedom as she can get; and, for
her, Disney55 may be a win. For the general counsel, it's a loss. You
law students who decide to get into in-house work will learn that, like
52.
53.
of 15
54.
55.

Wendy's International, Inc.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
Disney, 906 A.2d at 27.
Id.
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"the dog ate my homework," the first thing out of anybody's mouth
when there's a problem is, "but I ran it by the lawyers." Now that
might have been a run by at six thirty on the thirteenth tee, but
whatever.
As Bill intimated, getting the suit and not getting out of it on a
summary judgment is really a loss. There were thirty-seven days of
testimony in Disney.56 There is the element of Disney57 that you ought
to think about, though, and Professor Gold mentioned it this morning,
and that is whether there is anything unique or different about the
Delaware General Corporation Code at 102(b)(7) 58 where it uses the
term "good faith." Is that part of the duty of the care, part of the duty
of loyalty, or is it something else? And is an absence of good faith the
same thing as bad faith? Or are they different? That's a problem I
haven't been able to solve over a long time.
We know good faith. Bad faith isn't necessarily gross negligence or
failure of the duty of care. And where you find the really egregious
circumstance, like self-dealing or fraud on the part of the director, it's
not a problem, but there's a lot of other latitude.
Now as I'm sure Bill would remind me, in Disney59 neither the compensation committee, nor management in the form of the CEO, nor
probably the general counsel, if he had any say in it, and certainly not
management, followed what are called "best practices."
Anyhow, the result is right in Disney,60 but there was certainly a
failure to follow best practices. Let me leave for a minute what they
are. The flurry of all the people in this world who can talk about best
practices is one of the by-products of Sarbanes-Oxley or the environment that spawned Sarbanes-Oxley. 61 And just imagine a camel galloping wildly across the desert spreading sand, vegetation, and less
pleasant materials. That's some of the stuff that comes along with
62
Sarbanes.
But should we follow best practices? Probably. And the way I have
expressed it to many, including some who are on my board of directors, is that if you are a fish in a school, if you're an individual fish,
your desire is to be in the middle of the school. You don't want to be
behind it; you don't want to be ahead of it, with the barracudas and
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
of 15
62.

Id.
Id.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006).
906 A.2d at 27.
Id.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
Id.
DEL. CODE ANN.
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the sharks. Your chances of survival are better in the middle. Now
Warren Buffett hasn't used that analogy, but he has talked about how
compensation committees want all kinds of comparative data so that
they can look like everybody else and not be attacked.
Another benefit of best practices certainly is in dealing with the regulators. The regulators love checklists. They may be complex to put
together, but so long as they are easy to look at, that's fine; and then,
of course, there are the advisory services, ISS, Glass Lewis, some institutions, TIAA-CREF, and others who do their best to tell us how our
business ought to be run. And, in general, it seems to me those things
tend to be one size fits all. Fritz is getting ready to jab me because he
thinks I'm now on a rant.
There are some potential drawbacks, however; and practical advice
says to you take some care before you just adopt or recommend the
adoption of best practices.
One of them is that they can have serious distraction effects. One of
63
the things you heard this morning with respect to Sarbanes-Oxley,
for example-and we've all talked about-is the extent to which it
serves as a distraction to a board and a management team that otherwise might have more productive things on its mind. I don't say that is
universally true, but in part, that's true.
Another thing is that if you adopt practices, you are adopting
"gotchas"; because if you're familiar with the codes, your directors'
guidelines, and your charters for your committees, which provide for
the way certain things ought to be done, then it's pretty easy for somebody to prove that they have not done those things. Another concern
with the drawbacks of these things is one-size-fits-all.
ISS may-no, I won't say ISS. A particular commentator may say
the offices of the chairman of the board and the chief executive officer
should be separated. Maybe because they do it in England, maybe
because somebody at the Harvard Business School said those corporations do better, I don't know. But the question is, does that one size fit
all?
I think that particular fad is fading at this point. The city of New
York, to the extent it is an investor by virtue of pension funds, has
taken a universal position, as far as I know, with respect to certain
personnel items that may fit well in New York or Los Angeles. They
might fit well in Detroit. They may not play in Peoria or in Resume
Speed, Arkansas, and so on and so on.
63. Id.
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And then finally, at least one recommendation with respect to best
practices: One must think about the methodology one wants to use;
that is, what's the objective in adopting the methodology?
Now some advice that's consistent, I hope, with what you have
heard before. One of the things I will conclude with is that we're in a
fishbowl with corporations; and if you advise corporations, I think
you're in a fishbowl today, paranoid as that thought may be. Independence is critical. Independence by management of some decisions, independence of the boards, independence of the external experts, and
maybe, to some extent, the internal experts.
Group-inclusive deliberations are important. And I think deliberating long enough, if you can get it, for the board to achieve unanimity
on a particular decision is extremely important. Boards ought to be
fingers in-I mean, nose in, fingers out, so on and so forth. And then,
as you heard in the last presentation, you want to be able to prove
these things with some details, some care, and some follow-up.
Remember, of course, that records, like board-meeting minutes, can
be too specific. So it's more of a balance than just deciding how long
you can read a set of minutes.
So what's happening now? First, I think from the point of view of
the cases five years from now, I think there's an attitude that corporations have to be watched with suspicion. I find that disheartening because I think that it is not true with 99.9 percent of them, but maybe.
Second, I don't see any abatement in litigation against boards for
second-guessing the decisions they make. And I see and listen to-I
thought I listened to, in the last presentation, a nice evolution of theories of liability. I don't see regulatory actions abating. I think they will
continue to increase at least up to some point.
And then, as a substantive matter, (and my colleagues may want to
talk about it, but it bothers me, particularly in light of the discussions
that we had this morning with respect to objectives of hedge funds, i.e.
should short-term shareholders be permitted to vote and the like) it
can be a quandary for directors today as to whether the historic language about what is in the best long-term interest of the corporation
still has the same effect that it used to have. There's a short-term focus
now. Are there legitimate short-term objectives advanced by
shareholders?
And, finally, how to deal with those things. The best advice I can
provide today is process. Process is God, if there is one; information,
information flow, integrity of information, deliberation by everybody
including the guy who sweeps the floors, independence of particular
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matters, and a willingness and a desire and an ability to go back and
prove that all those things occurred. Let me take a breath.
MR. SCHORLING: Lee, you talked about independent directors,
and that's the buzz word and the watch word for publicly traded companies now. What impact does-do the independent evaluation firms
have on behavior of independent directors, many of whom also sit on
other boards?
MR. McCORKLE: Sure. I think directors care in the same way that
you care about the reputation of the law firm; I care about the reputation of the company. They care that, to some extent, the ratings for
governance principles are good. They care that their company is seen
as one that is socially responsible.
I obviously can't answer-I can't answer in detail because you haven't asked me in detail-but my impression is that directors generally
pay attention to those ratings and care about them.
Now I know that there are directors-there are companies in Ohio,
for example, who are downgraded by most rating agencies because
they have staggered boards; and the boards have said that's a downgrade they will live with. But I know others have paid attention to the
separation of the chief executive officer and the chair of the board.
MR. SCHORLING: Let's go to something with a little more guts to
it. How about-there is a proposal by a hedge fund that the board
incur debt to pay a dividend to shareholders in order to improve the
return of shareholders and ISS comes out in favor of that provision?
Do you think that that affects how independent directors will vote?
MR. McCORKLE: No, but I believe that if they vote in the affirmative, they will certainly consider that ISS supports it. It appears that
there are a number of institutions, investors, and perhaps others, who
pay attention to ISS, Glass Lewis, and GMI, and other rating agencies
with respect to shareholder proposals; and, as you put it, I think it cuts
back on the responsibility. ISS has become very successful.
MR. SCHORLING: Should that be the case if the directors form
the view or are you of the opinion that by incurring that debt, they will
decrease the amount of capital the company can use within the business because they have to pay that debt long-term and the hedge
funds will sell out once the value of the stock spikes because there was
a perceived benefit to short-term holders from the distribution?
MR. McCORKLE: You almost answered the question in the way
you ask it. But it does raise very clearly the question of if that action
were taken, and if it were to cause a departure of certain elements in
the shareholder population, would that work to the long-term benefit
of the company? I think on more facts and more deliberation I can
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answer the question in either direction, but I would certainly be-I
would want to have the process to support that decision.
MR. SCHORLING: Do you have an opinion as to whether or not
it's having an impact on transactions generally in the market?
MR. McCORKLE: It being ISS?
MR. SCHORLING: ISS, yes.
MR. McCORKLE: No, I'm not competent to form-to answer that.
I doubt it, but I don't know.
MR. SCHORLING: Fritz?
MR. REED: I think it does have an impact because I think boards
are aware that-or maybe take a holistic view of what ISS's positions
will be that are not issue by issue. If you sort of fork their goal in this
issue, they will take positions with respect to director votes or a variety of other things that concern them. And, how it plays out in a caseby-case basis-I don't have either any empirical evidence or even anecdotal evidence-but I know they think about it; and if they think
about it, it's having some effect.
MR. McCORKLE: I'm not aware of any example by any of the
rating agencies in which they have taken positions unique to specific
corporations; that is to say, if they were to support separation of CEO
and chair of the board, they take that with respect to everybody. They
don't say it's all right for GM to combine them, but GE to separate
them; and, therefore, they're not advocates for specific actions by specific corporations.
MR. SCHORLING: By what standards are they judged?
MR. McCORKLE: As far as I know, none.
MR. SCHORLING: Is that a problem?
MR. McCORKLE: Well, if their services are hired, it seems to me
that people do pay attention to their services and pay attention to the
source. I don't-I could hardly be excused for hiring an incompetent
lawyer and never looking at her credentials.
A board-you would say, I think, that if a board were considering a
specific action and it got advice from an investment banker or accounting board, independent lawyer, or any other advice that, to some
extent, the board has a duty, at least in the first instance, to get that
advice from somebody reliable. I don't know what examination, institutional or otherwise, shareholders give to their sources-GMI, ISS,
whether they want to follow TIAA-CREF in particular, I have no
idea.
MR. REED: I want to ask one more question before we move on to
the last topic, and it is: Do you guys think that the board function is
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being sapped very badly by what we heard described in the SarbanesOxley discussion and what we're describing here as a sort of overblown focus on process?
If the board and the audit committee are spending all of their time
listening to a parade of people report on compliance, 404 compliance
under Sarbanes 6 4 and other compliance, and every time they make a
decision, if what they are doing is running around documenting it so
that the business judgment rule can be justified in case they're sued,
they're not spending that time doing what they're supposed to be doing, which is considering the business plan, the prospects, and the best
interest of the corporation as experienced people bringing their own
independent judgment to bear. Maybe they are doing that some, but
they are definitely doing it less if they're doing all these other things
that are aimed purely at process and covering their butts.
MR. McCORKLE: I think it would be-I think it would be not
complete to say they're focusing only on process and covering their
butts.
MR. REED: Exaggeration never hurt anybody.
MR. McCORKLE: That's all right. You wanted to charge me up.
One of the things that the board cares about in responsibly fulfilling
its duties is that the actions that it takes have the integrity to stick.
Boards, in general, aren't out looking to get sued or do things that
aren't going to hold on. So part of what-I would say that covering
their butts is a little bit pejorative. Also I make my living with that
kind of coverage I guess. That's the answer.
MR. SCHORLING: Do you think the markets-I am going to pose
a different question. Do you think that the markets' focus on shortterm recoveries and the hedge funds participation as active shareholders has affected the decisions of boards of directors?
MR. REED: It has to. I mean, they have the voting power to put
directors on the board whose sole instruction from the people who
elected them is to put through the programs of the hedge fund. Absolutely, it's doing that.
MR. SCHORLING: Is that a good thing or bad thing?
MR. REED: Well, it was-that's sort of a social view as to whether
or not the hedge funds are appropriate, or whether or not they're kind
of greedy and blood thirsty.
It is an interesting juxtaposition, I guess, that you started the discussion in this group by saying that the first theory was that one of the
64. Id.
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reasons that you need the teamtheory is because voting doesn't work.
It clearly does work. It's just that you don't like the result.
MR. SCHORLING: By not work, I'm saying that from an economic
standpoint it may not maximize economic values.
MR. REED: Because to the extent that they have enough power,
and they do, they are able to put through programs that are to their
specific benefit; and, when they do that, I think it's detrimental to the
corporation.
MR. SCHORLING: Okay. The only place where I can point to empirical evidence of that is in Chapter Twenty-Twos where I think
there's evidence that the short-term claim holders are forcing the reorganized companies to come out with too much debt and, as a result,
the companies are failing; and it's my view that these boards are not
exercising their discretion appropriately to say no to that, and they're
putting at risk the long-term viability of their companies.
MR. McCORKLE: With the empirical evidence that exists today, I
think it's certainly money around; and, by all indications, you got to
make this pretty strong and living on it. What we may not know, we
may not know the impact until some pretty fundamental changes have
happened that we haven't gotten in front of. One hopes we don't have
a disaster so that the cow is gone, horse, both sheep, all the rabbits,
and even the raiding rats have gotten out of the barn, and then Congress shows up with an incredibly overpowering and detailed piece of
legislation; not that that's ever happened before, but I think that we
might have. I just don't think the answer to the question-I believe
there's an impact, but I'm not sure what it is.
MR. SCHORLING: Fritz, are you ready?
MR. REED: Yes, I guess I'm back to the Monty Python quotes:
"Now for something completely different. ' 65 That is from Monty
66
Python.
The two prior presentations or the subject matter of the two prior
presentations dealt with general overviews. Certainly the question of
to whom the overall duties of a board of directors are due is a general
theory. The idea of what the standard of care should be is a general
theory.
I want to talk about something significantly more specific. It is executive compensation and what is happening in that area. It is last not
because it's best, but because it's got good stuff in it. It's got greed and
65. AND NOW FOR SOMETHING COMPLETELY DIFFERENT (Columbia Pictures Corporation

1971).
66. Id.
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it's got envy and it's got ridiculous legislative and other responses,
looting of corporations and that kind of stuff, and so it's easier to talk
about that if you're last on the agenda.
It's a mixed bag as we talk about it. We want to talk about it in 1)
the context of public companies that are not in bankruptcy, 2) a little
bit about what's happening in a bankruptcy context, 3) the overlap of
what the drivers are that cause this to be a public concern right now
between nonbankruptcy and bankruptcy stuff, and 4) what those legislative and regulatory responses to this are. That is, especially in the
time left, probably enough.
The drivers themselves I think are ones that you have all seen.
There's a little bit in the materials that are summaries of the news
items that have gotten public attention and the general, interest of the
public and, therefore, legislatures. It's abuse. The kind of abuse that
we're talking about are the reworking of bonus targets for executives
after they miss them, to go back and redefine the targets so that you
can give them a big bonus. Backdating of options is always a nice topic
and the people who have been doing that. Simple big payments to
CEOs and other named executives in down times as well as in good
times; that is, a corporation has falling profits, cash and stock prices,
and the bonus and the compensation for the CEO, among others, goes
up.
Big numbers simply by themselves are-a guy named Nardelli, who
is now the departed CEO of Home Depot, got 210 million bucks as a
severance package. It's not exactly on point, but Dick Grasso's 140
million severance for the New York Stock Exchange-it probably is a
little on point because the people on the board who approved that are
CEOs of all these other corporations. And when they are doing numbers like that, you sit up and take notice as to what's happening with
boards and with CEOs.
Just perks by themselves are the kind of things that make great
news. The use of the corporate plane has been the big one-you
know, private use for CEOs and their families. Club memberships are
big and are dying now because of disclosure requirements. Financial
counseling is one of my favorites. The financial counseling that the
corporation pays the CEO because they're paying him so much
money he can't figure out what to do with it himself is a circularity
that is great for newspapers and for legislators to get their hands on.
One of my personal favorites on the perk list is the guy who was
making eight figures, and the first one wasn't a one, and he had the
corporation buy his Book of the Month Club membership. That kind
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of stuff is the kind of stuff that has resulted in a reaction not just from
shareholders, but from regulators.
In the nonbankruptcy public company context, we have a variety of
things going on. What has happened are new SEC disclosures rules. 6 7
And we are in proxy-we are in proxy time right now with the new
disclosure rules coming out really for the first time. And it's interesting to see what the reaction will be at annual meetings of shareholders
when the new numbers and the new disclosures are put together.
MR. McCORKLE: As a footnote, I might say that, as I recall, that
was five pages from the Securities Exchange Commission and 373
pages by the staff.
MR. REED: Yes, and it's certainly a bunch of pages of everybody's
proxy statement now because, among other thingsMR. McCORKLE: Printing costs alone.
MR. REED: -it can't be understood particularly well.
The things that are driving or that drove that, we talked a little bit
about the drivers, you know, the absolute pay has been a problem
certainly. One of the political drivers of it is the continuing increase in
disparity between CEO, or all executive pay, and average worker pay.
You see that twenty-six years ago the average comparison between
the average worker and the CEO's pay was ten bucks for the CEO for
each buck for the average worker. Now twenty-six years later, the average is 436 to one instead of ten to one; the kind of number, if it's
true, that will get everybody's attention. Even if it's not true, it's close
enough to true, that the numbers-there are certainly-there are a lot
of mitigating factors as well that you don't see. That kind of statistic is
always-I think it was Benjamin Disraeli, some people think Mark
Twain, but I think Benjamin Disraeli said there are three kinds of lies:
there are lies, there are damn lies, and there are statistics. 68
MR. SCHORLING: Disraeli.
MR. REED: Yeah, I think it was Disraeli.
These statistics are impressive on their face. You don't usually see
the other side.
The poster boy I think for corporate extravagance in terms of-or
at least the current poster boy is a guy named William McGuire, who
is the departing CEO of United Health. And I don't remember-he
had accumulated stock options when he finally left that were 1.2-it
67. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 232, 239,
240, 245, 249, 274 (2006).
68. See QuoteWorld.org, http://www.quoteworld.org/quotes/3776 (last visited September 17,
2007) (quoting Benjamin "Dizzy" Disraeli).
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was more than a billion dollars. It was a lot of money. I was reading in
preparation for talking a little bit about this, and I was just interested
to see what the increase in the stock value was during his tenure while
he was accumulating these things over ten years. And I don't know
whether or not-actually I think I do know. It doesn't get me to paying the guy a billion two, but the increase in the stock value was, in
fact, eleven thousand percent. So I thought he did okay.
And, indeed, some of the reasons his options were as valuable as
they were is he substantially outstripped the expectations of the company who granted him the options to begin with. Yes, sir?
MR. LOU ROBIN: I heard recently that there were a few CEOs
taking one dollar compensation but taking huge stock options of
stock.
MR. REED: There are people who are taking, as direct pay, one
dollar; or, in some cases, Steve Jobs takes zero, and then they take
options. There are people who assumed their position by virtue of
owning a big chunk of the corporation, and they're simply taking it on
stock appreciation. And those kinds of things happen.
MR. LOU ROBIN: But my question is, I heard recently that one
reason they take just these stock options, i.e., the stock as compensation instead of a salary, is to avoid the Medicare tax, which I heard for
million dollars would be like thirty-five thousand dollars. Have you
heard that?
MR. REED: That may be true in some cases. I mean, the guy for
Tyco who tried to save eight dollars and something on-I think it was
more than eight bucks, but it wasn't enough more for what he was
paying.
MR. SCHORLING: Sales tax.
MR. REED: Yeah, the sales tax on art, those kinds of things. It
sounds to me frankly more like no good deed goes unpunished. This is
a rich guy and we don't like him so we're finding a reason why even
taking zero is bad. But, maybe they're doing it for that reason.
MR. SCHORLING: One of my side lines has been representing senior executives in the negotiation of their compensation, and I think
when I have represented people like that, the driver was twofold.
One, it was caused by their extreme confidence in how good they
were. And, two, it was driven by the fact that given the results they
thought they were going to produce, there's no way a board could
approve that compensation up front because it would be so large as to
shock the conscience. And so some of them were, in fact, quite successful and were paid a lot of money. But that was what was driving it.
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MR. LOU ROBIN: Are you saying stock options and the stock or
taking these little nickel and dimesMR. SCHORLING: No, no, stock options. They were paid a dollar
and taking the stock options because if you paid them what they
thought they were worth up front, it would shock the conscience. The
board couldn't justify that to the shareholders. So they wanted to take
the stock options because they thought they were going to make the
upside and make that much more money.
MR. McCORKLE: It would be interesting to see what the new disclosure rules do to some of these arrangements. I hate to say it that I
like having to write longer proxy statements, but, in this case, I might
actually buy in.
There is the element, however, which is this: If you show me and a
hundred others somebody who makes more money than we do, we're
going to be satisfied that that person is overpaid.
There is-Fritz has given some real unreasonable examples, and it's
hard to justify. I wouldn't intend to. But there is the factor of what the
board thinks it needs when it hires the CEO and how competitive that
market is. As Fritz said, if I had owned stock with the company that
increased its value eleven thousand times, all power to him. I'm
happy. I made money, too.
MR. REED: Assuming that's the constituency you want to benefit.
MR. McCORKLE: Myself, I'm talking about.
MR. JOE MARINO: But you're talking about the board approving
these incredibly huge payments or formulas when you see that they
were scammed in many ways where the CEO comes in and says, look,
I won't take-I will take a dollar the first year, dollar the second year,
and then I will take twenty percent of the profits the third year. And
the first two years he's front-loading prepayment expenses, so in the
last year they doubled or tripled. It just seems to me that the board
lacks sophistication to deal with a con man scheme like that.
Are these companies so difficult to run that there are only five or
six people who can hold them up for these outlandish compensation
packages?
MR. REED: Well, I think that to the extent that what you say is
they're being paid too much and it's shocking, it's hard to disagree
with that. To say that they were scammed or that they didn't understand is, I think, not true. They have advisors.
Now I'm not saying it doesn't happen in small, middle-market companies, but that's not where these numbers happen. You're talking
about a board and a compensation committee that have expert advi-
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sors who make projections as to what they say a home run will be in
terms of-in terms of incremental value in their stock. They set options that, if those things are met, the options will be worth a certain
number, and then, in the case, for example, it gets outstripped by the
performance twenty or thirty times. John Reed, from Citicorp talking
on exactly this subject, says that when that happens, what the board, if
it had any guts, as he said, would do, is make sure that when they give
options later they take into consideration the fact that the guy has
been paid more than they thought.
I will tell you that as I read that, that's a guy who's talking to the
press because it makes no sense to me. What you do when you take
that position is to say, look, I wanted an increase that was a hundred
bucks. How dare you give me one that was ten thousand? I'll punish
you for that. Never let that happen again.
What is it that says we made a projection that we thought was a
home run. You didn't hit a home run. You hit a grand slam and you
did it in consecutive innings, and now I'm going to punish you for that.
That still doesn't get me to a billion, two. I understand that. But
there is something wrong with the concept that says when you very
meticulously set it towards the goal and then the goal gets blown away
by the performance that that's a punishable offense.
MR. JOE MARINO: It would seem to me that, lawyers are paid
when we take a contingency fee, and it's on a sliding scale due to the
size so that there's a larger percentage, the lower the dollars, and then
the percentage goes down as the number comes up. I mean, it
wouldn't make any difference if somebody said to them something
very similar that they would have a compensation and then, if it exceeds that it would be less because, look, we're going to give you ten
percent of the earnings if you make a million dollars; but, if you make
ten million, we're not going to give you ten percent.
MR. REED: But that's not what they're doing. They're using stock
options and they're saying we're giving you fifteen shares. Everybody
else got increasingly richer who owned those shares, too.
I mean, this isn't cash. This is equity that has increased in value
along with the equity of the rest of the company.
MR. JOE MARINO: Yeah, but the benefit of the stock is thatwell, obviously, if they get the shares of stock then that's income to
them even though it's not cash, so the optionMR. REED: It is when they cash them.
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MR. JOE MARINO: Until the option is exercised. But if you pay
somebody a million shares of stock and the stock is a dollar a share,
that day he has a taxable event of a million dollars.
MR. SCHORLING: Talking about stock options, one of the hypos
that I had in my materials is that the management discloses that the
corporation set aside fifteen percent of its equity for the stock option
program for management. That's the United Airlines plan of reorganization. Yes. Fifteen percent of the equity. Makes you wonder who's
managing what.
MR. REED: I know you all would rather drink than talk to me and
it's coming in a few minutes.
MR. McCORKLE: Boy, I'll buy into that, man.
MR. REED: Let me talk quickly about the responses that have happened. We've talked about the fact that the SEC has these disclosure
requirements. They are out now. It's proxy season.
In the materials there, it gives you chapter and verse on what the
detail is, and I wouldn't purport to go through that now anyway. But
the one number that's important that didn't used to be there is at the
end of the summary table. There is now what's called the "wow number," which is the total when they add it all up; and that's where shareholders will start to see things for the first time. It is already clearly
cutting into perks because people who are embarrassed by the perks
they were taking, which weren't quite disclosed that way, are now cutting them down. That's in the SEC nonbankruptcy situation.
Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code 6 9 is dealing with it, sort of, as it
relates to-as to bankruptcy, and there are very different drivers
there. The question of job security, or pay as compared to retention
from the standpoint of the company, is what that's about; and, by and
large, Congress in Section 50370 has said, if it's a retention program,
you can't do it. The verbiage is a little bit different from that, but
that's ultimately what it means. So you have these legislative responses and we're about to see what the effect is.
Both in bankruptcy and in the SEC, there is additional stuff going
on right now. There is a bill that has been considered-I guess it will
be considered-Cathy, help me-tomorrowMS. CATHY VANCE: The bill on allowing shareholders to vote
issue was considered on the House floor yesterday. 7 1 Business was un69. 11 U.S.C. § 503 (2006).
70. Id.
71. See 153 CONG. REC. H3499-01, H3508-02, H3529-05 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007).
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finished. It's due to be taken up again tomorrow morning where a
vote is expected.
MR. REED: That bill is not-that bill is a vote that is an advisory,
not a binding vote by shareholders, that is on two things. 72 One is on
compensation of named executives, which tend to be the top five re73
porting officers or the highest paid, and on golden parachutes.
Again, it's an advisory vote.
The House Judiciary Committee is also starting up-and this was
just in the news this morning-a consideration of total compensation
for CEOs in bankruptcy as compared to outside bankruptcy brought
under the title, their title, which is How Much is Too Much; and they
are considering trying to legislate specific limitations on executive
compensation, not just retention, but the compensation of any kind in
74
bankruptcy.
The principal kind of news releases that they're doing in that regard
deal almost exclusively with comparisons between CEO pay and average worker pay, and that is-you will see that echoed in Section 503 of
75
the Bankruptcy Code as well.
But those are the kinds of things that are happening.
MR. SCHORLING: Cathy, when's the hearing on that? Tuesday?
MS. CATHY VANCE: I believe it was Tuesday and it was before
the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Commercial and Admin76
istrative Law.
MR. SCHORLING: Of the House?
MS. CATHY VANCE: Yes, sorry.
MR. McCORKLE: This is more federal corporate governance law.
MR. REED: It's simple compensation limitation because people
are shocked; and, in many cases, they deserve to be shocked. There
are big numbers out there.
That's sort of the thumbnail of what's going on in the compensation
area, a little bit of why and, at least, the structure of the legislative and
regulatory responses that some of the numbers that have been bandied about-some of the actions, not just the numbers, but the way
they got there by screwing around with the dating stock options and
72. H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
73. Id.
74. Executive Compensation in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases: How Much is Too Much?: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Com. and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1
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backdating targets and revising targets and revising the strike points
for options for a variety of things that had been solely for purposesMR. McCORKLE: How prevailing is that?
MR. REED: I don't think it's all that common, but it is abusive
when it happens, and that's the thing which the great statutes are
made of.
MR. SCHORLING: Fritz, what do you think the impact of disclosing compensation will be on going private?
MR. REED: From the CEO standpoint, the biggest part of the
compensation total requires liquidity and the ability to get rid of the
options. If you go private and you got a public company, the ability to
cash it out isMR. SCHORLING: But you know that in the going private transaction, they're going to offer the chief executive more equity in the
company than they have right now.
MR. REED: They will, but it's more liquid.
MR. SCHORLING: It is until they go public. You don't have to
deal with all the disclosure anymore.
MR. REED: And that will be the deposit. The lesson is, if it's
harder to sell, it doesn't spend as well. So it will be a mixed bag.
MR. SCHORLING: Just to piggyback on what Fritz said. I have
been-I was in Congress along with Lou about, what, two, three
weeks ago, Lou? I would say the only two things that really had traction in the legislative arena were executive compensation and corporate governance.
MR. LOU ROBIN: Prime loans, too. Subprime loans.
MR. SCHORLING: Those are the areas in which Congress has an
interest. Whether they'll pass any legislation on it, who knows. Thank
you.

